Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)   International / domestic magazine：International journal  

DOI： 10.1177/09516298221103143

Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

DOI： 10.1007/s10101-016-0189-x

Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

This study investigates the effect of income inequality on economic growth in nondemocratic regimes. We provide a model in which a self-interested ruler chooses an institution that constrains his or her policy choice. The ruler must care about the extent of citizens' support in order to remain in power. Under an extractive institution, the ruler can extract a large share of citizens' wealth, but faces a high probability of losing power because of low public support. We show that inequality affects the ruler's tradeoff between the expropriation of citizens' wealth and his or her hold on power. Substantial inequality among citizens makes support for the ruler inelastic with respect to his or her institutional choice. The ruler therefore chooses an extractive institution, which impedes investment and growth. These results provide an explanation for the negative relationship between inequality and growth as well as the negative relationship between inequality and institutional quality, both of which are observed in nondemocratic countries.

DOI： 10.1007/s11127-016-0387-7

Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

This paper analyzes the effect of recent technical change on the labor market and explains the observed differences in wage inequality among advanced countries. In particular, we focus on the difference between the inequality in the U.S. and in continental Europe. Many studies have indicated a rise in wage inequality in the U.S. over the past three decades. On the other hand, there has been little change in wage inequality in continental Europe. By introducing human capital investment into the model by Acemoglu (Am Econ Rev 89:1259-1278, 1999), we show that ex ante homogeneous economies would have distinct ex post wage distribution. The strategic complementarity between human capital investment and firms' hiring strategies yields the possibility that multiple equilibria exist, which explains the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe. In addition, we show that differences in tax or education systems can explain the difference in wage distribution between the U.S. and Europe.

DOI： 10.1007/s10888-012-9223-6

Publishing type：Research paper (scientific journal)  

In this paper, we analyze the connection between the history of colonial rule and postcolonial development in Africa. We focus on the fact that many African colonies were governed by indirect rule. Under indirect rule, indigenous people are divided into two groups: a privileged ruling group and an unprivileged ruled group. Our model assumes that the ruled group cannot observe how the resources appropriated from them are divided between the colonial ruler and the ruling group. In this economy, excessive exploitation by the colonial ruler creates distrust among indigenous groups and a negative effect on postcolonial economic and political development.

DOI： 10.1007/s11127-009-9461-8

Book type：Scholarly book

CiNii Books

Audience： High school students